


Genocide in Cambodia and East Timor

Action and Inaction: the Failures of the International Community in Southeast Asia's Genocides



Chris Anderson 42455022 Dec 7, 2006
 History 402 - Dr Steven Lee
 Violence & Trauma in the Late 20th Century
 The University of British Columbia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	4
Part 1: Cambodia	5
The Background and Nature of the Cambodian Genocide	5
Proposed Causes and Contributing Factors of the Cambodian Genocide	10
Action and Inaction of International Actors	13
Part 2: East Timor	16
The Background and Nature of the Genocide in East Timor	16
Proposed Causes and Contributing Factors of the Genocide in East Timor	20
Action and Inaction of International Actors	23
Conclusion	27
Notes	29
Works Cited	34
Works Consulted	38

Genocide in Cambodia and East Timor

The choice of topic for this paper arose out of the author's personal trip to Cambodia in December 2005 and the time spent one afternoon in the countryside with a local family whose smiling, aged patriarch (pictured on the cover riding his bicycle) had been shot in the leg during the Khmer Rouge regime. The photos on the cover are intended to illustrate the lingering effects of the violence surrounding the genocides, effects which remain all too evident in Cambodia and East Timor today. Today, Western tourists flock to Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, East Timor; often, they overlook the importance of the role played by Western governments in the violence that contributed to the current state of underdevelopment of each country.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1975, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge rebel group rolled into Phnom Penh, seizing power in Cambodia. In December of that same year, two thousand miles away on the other edge of Southeast Asia, the Indonesian military invaded East Timor.¹ The Khmer Rouge spent the next four years in power; during this time nearly a quarter of the population of Cambodia died.² The Indonesian military spent the last quarter of the twentieth century occupying East Timor; roughly one fifth of that small nation's population died.³

The deaths in each of these examples have been described as "genocide," but not without criticism. The international community, for its failure to help stop the bloodshed, is often apportioned part of the blame for these deaths. However, the true nature of the active role played in these two genocides by foreign powers, in particular by the United States and Britain, is often overlooked or forgotten. Somewhat ironically, in an attempt to curb what they saw as the increasing regional influence of Vietnamese communists, the United States began actively supporting the communist Khmer Rouge regime shortly after the fall of Phnom Penh.⁴ Secret documents show that, only a few months after this, just one day before Indonesia invaded East Timor, US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave Indonesian President Suharto approval for his country's planned military action.⁵

This paper seeks to show that, in each case, the activities of foreign powers, instead of thwarting the genocide, actually contributed to it. The paper is divided into two parts: one part covers Cambodia and the other covers East Timor. Each part is further divided into three sections detailing the background and nature of each genocide, the proposed causes and contributing factors, and the action and inaction of international players.

CAMBODIA

“I don’t want to talk, it’s too late. But I will never forgive the journalists and the Westerners. They didn’t believe us. I no longer want anything to do with the Cambodians, they chased me from my country.”⁶

– Sim, a Sino-Cambodian who fled the Khmer Rouge by boat to Thailand in 1974

THE BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE

On April 17, 1975, Khmer Rouge forces rolled into Phnom Penh, defeating Lon Nol’s forces and finally securing control over Cambodia after many years of struggle. Thirty years later, the legacy is that nearly 20,000 mass graves and almost 200 secret prison torture centres have been found in Cambodia, with over 700,000 people estimated to have been executed during four years of Khmer Rouge rule.⁷ Approximately one million people who were not executed died of hunger and disease.⁸ One particularly disturbing aspect of the violence committed in Cambodia is the set of methods used to kill: 53% by having their skull crushed with repeated blows of a pick or hammer, 29% shot, 6% hanged or strangled, 5% slit throats, 5% beaten to death, and 2% by often extremely disturbing public execution to set an example to others.⁹

In 1970, five years before the Khmer Rouge came to power, Prince Sihanouk was overthrown by his ministers over his policy of turning a blind eye to the North Vietnamese troops using Cambodia as a staging ground for their war against the United States. This new Cambodian government was bitterly opposed to North Vietnam and demanded the removal of troops from Cambodia. Out of their mutual hatred for the Cambodian government, the Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk formed a coalition and began receiving support from North Vietnam and the Soviet Union.¹⁰ China, meanwhile, supported the Khmer Rouge to counter

rival Soviet influence in the region.¹¹ Within five years, the Khmer Rouge had successfully taken control of the entire country, purged the Vietnamese elements in its ranks, and killed thousands of Cambodians. However, the dead bodies in the jungle could not compare to the torture and killings that would take place over the next four years.

Immediately upon assuming power, the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot began the mass evacuation of all urban centres. All city dwellers were marched into the countryside to fulfill Pol Pot's goal of a highly productive agricultural, rural society. Those who asked for an explanation of the orders to leave were simply told that the Americans were going to bomb the cities.¹² Anyone with links to the former government, regardless of how low-level, was targeted for execution. People who showed signs of education were also killed, including students, teachers, and doctors. In the twisted logic of the Khmer Rouge, signs of education even included wearing eyeglasses.¹³

Before we can make any conclusions about the causes and consequences of the genocide, we must first establish that genocide did indeed take place. The framework within which this can be done is the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, known more commonly the conventional title, *The Genocide Convention*:

“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;*
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;*
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;*
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;*
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”¹⁴*

The killings in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge were not systematic to the same extent as the Nazi “final solution,” but there certainly was some semblance of order to the

chaos. First, they killed those suspected of involvement in the previous regime. Then, they killed those who were educated or members of the upper class. Technically, since none of these is a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, the thousands who died were simply victims of mass murder. However, the Khmer Rouge also deliberately targeted minority ethnic groups such as the *montagnard* hill tribes, Chinese, and the Cham Muslims.¹⁵ The members of these groups who were not killed were forced to abandon their traditional ways of life, including wearing traditional clothing and jewellery and practising their religion. They were then forced into hard labour akin to slavery, a useful way to get some productivity out of them before they died of disease, malnutrition, and exhaustion.

The Khmer Rouge banned religion, money, and personal possessions. Anyone holding on to any of these was punished, usually executed. Part of the process to rid the country of religion involved targeting thousands of Khmer Buddhist monks. Although Buddhism survived the Khmer Rouge period surprisingly well, the monks were the keepers of cultural literacy in Cambodia. With their murders, a significant quantity of irreplaceable texts and artefacts documenting Cambodia's history and culture was lost or destroyed.¹⁶

Perhaps influenced by Pol Pot's personal paranoia about Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge expelled 150,000 Vietnamese and executed on sight any Vietnamese left in Cambodia or Cambodians with links to Vietnam. Approximately 10,000 Vietnamese people who failed to leave the country were killed.¹⁷ Interestingly, among those killed in the internal purges of the Khmer Rouge were revolutionaries of Vietnamese origin who had spent years fighting loyally in Pol Pot's army.¹⁸

“People from the Eastern zone would be known by their scarf. If you were wearing a blue scarf they would kill you.”¹⁹

– Huy Rady, a Cambodian survivor and eye-witness

In a process eerily reminiscent of the Nazi preparation for the Final Solution, the inhabitants of the Eastern zone of Cambodia were made to wear a blue and white version of the traditional Khmer scarf. All other Cambodians were forced to wear the red and white or yellow and white versions and were prohibited from wearing the blue. Shipped to other areas of the country, the people with blue scarves were given less food and forced to work harder, until they died. Their only crime was living in the Eastern zone, the area closest to Vietnam. They were accused of having “Khmer bodies, but Vietnamese heads.”²⁰

Probably the most jaw-dropping aspect of the Khmer Rouge period in power is the sheer scale of brutality inflicted on the people of Cambodia. There are two prime illustrations of this brutality: the Killing Fields all over the country and Tuol Sleng, the notorious prison in Phnom Penh where, out of roughly 14,000 people who entered, less than a dozen ever survived.²¹

“The Killing Fields” were the sites where the bodies were buried of those people who failed to survive after being sent out to the fields to live and work in agricultural communes, under unbelievably harsh conditions, with extreme food insecurity and a constant threat of being taken away and executed by the Khmer Rouge. Cambodians also sometimes refer to the period itself as the era of the Killing Fields. Forced to produce huge amounts of rice, the people were given very little to eat, and what they did receive was far from a healthy, balanced diet.²² Families were deliberately split up, and children were taught to monitor their parents and denounce them.²³ The re-education techniques of the Khmer Rouge were relatively

successful with the children, who were less difficult to mould into brainwashed army recruits.²⁴

Tuol Sleng, known during the Khmer Rouge era as S-21, is today a world famous museum documenting the horrors that occurred there. A former high school, S-21 was one of 189 centres used as prisons for torture and eventual execution. People were sent to there for the same arbitrary reasons that people in the fields were executed in the quiet of the night; there was often no substantive reason, perhaps an unsubstantiated rumour of Vietnamese ties or being a CIA agent. Upon entering S-21, prisoners were locked up in jail cells, immobilized in leg irons, and only allowed out when it was their turn to be tortured into confessing treasonous acts they had never committed, and implicating family members and friends, often as supposed CIA agents, and admitting to being animals, not human beings.²⁵

The prisoners' confessions and a photo of each one were recorded by the guards and are now hauntingly displayed on the museum walls and display boards.²⁶ The torturers were themselves prisoners who knew that any reluctance or mistake in carrying out orders meant their own torture and death.²⁷ Over a third of the guards and torturers at S-21 were executed there.²⁸

PROPOSED CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE

“... a Kampuchea which is independant, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, with sovereignty over its territorial integrity, in a society in which happiness, equality, justice, and true democracy reign, without rich or poor, without exploiting class or exploited class, a society in which the entire people lives in harmony and great national unity and bands together to contribute to the production effort and, together, to build and defend the country.”²⁹

– Preamble to the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea

The Cambodian genocide demonstrates the horror of the human capacity to torture and murder fellow human beings, without a guilty conscience, when the right conditions are present.

The roots of the Cambodian genocide are found in the Maoist political and economic beliefs of the Khmer Rouge leadership. The most important leaders, all of whom studied in Paris in the 1950s and became active in the communist movement together, were Saloth Sar (who would later re-brand himself as Pol Pot), Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan.³⁰ The significance of their time together in France is that they developed what to them seemed a coherent political and economic model for the future of their home country, Cambodia.³¹

In his doctoral thesis, Khieu Samphan blamed Cambodia’s lack of development on the economic domination of the developed world and argued that self-reliance was the key to a brighter future.³² The method to achieve this goal: a mass peasant movement supporting a social revolution to reduce rents and eliminate usury.³³ In the context of the Vietnam War and Lon Nol’s regime in Cambodia, the idea of a mass movement for social revolution was transformed into one of violent revolution. To achieve this goal within a Maoist framework, the Khmer Rouge leaders designed a plan to produce massive quantities of rice for export, which would generate enough revenue to make Cambodia self-reliant and therefore no longer

dominated by the industrialized countries. Influenced by the Marxist writings of André Gunder Frank, the leaders adopted the belief that “cities are parasitic on the countryside, that only labor value is true value, that cities extract surplus value from the rural areas.”³⁴

While these tenets of the Khmer Rouge ideological framework may seem fairly benign, they formed the foundation for the Cambodian genocide. Combining this blended ideology with Maoist ruthlessness inspired by official visits to China, along with an ends-justifies-the-means attitude, the Khmer Rouge planned the evacuation of urban centres and the mass collective agriculture project they believed was the key to Cambodia’s future. Their strong faith in their cause and their unique communist theory allowed them to sacrifice any principles they may have had, to achieve the end goal. Thus, they came to the conclusion that only a fraction of the population was necessary to build the new society, paving the way for the gruesome murder of thousands and the starvation deaths of many more.

The genocide could not have been carried out by the Khmer Rouge leadership alone, so one question many researchers have asked is why did the soldiers, the prisoners, the civilians kill their fellow countrymen? The extremely complex answer to this question is summarized very well in Gregory H Stanton’s “Eight Stages of Genocide.”³⁵

According to Stanton, founder of The Cambodian Genocide Program at Yale, each of the stages leading up to genocide does not, in itself, appear particularly worrisome.³⁶ For example, by classifying the people into minorities, religious groups, urbanites, peasants, professionals, the educated and so on, the Khmer Rouge created a division between ‘us’ and ‘the others.’ By classifying and then symbolizing the people, as was done with the aforementioned blue scarves, those people became dehumanized. Once ‘the others’ are equated with something more primitive than ‘us’ humans, Stanton argues, it becomes much easier to kill without a

guilty conscience. The last major stage in turning ordinary people into murderers is polarization by extremists – driving groups apart by emphasizing the differences, as the Khmer Rouge did by contrasting the uneducated peasants with the urbanites, the educated, members of the government and the upper classes, and more. With these factors in place, it is understandable that someone whose life is in the balance could follow orders and kill others or even become a torturer.

ACTION AND INACTION OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

“There is no British Government involvement of any kind in training, equipping or co-operation, with the Khmer Rouge forces or those allied to them.”³⁷

– Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1979-1990

The failure of the developed world to take action against the Cambodian genocide is significant. The active support of some players on the international stage for the Khmer Rouge regime is inexcusable.

Although in some cases of genocide it may be argued that insufficient evidence was available at the time of the tragedies, this is certainly not the case in Cambodia. The news of Khmer Rouge massacres and inhumane treatment was broadcast to the world in François Ponchaud’s journal article, “Le Kampuchéa Démocratique: Une Révolution radicale.”³⁸ Yet Noam Chomsky, one of a number of supporters of the Khmer Rouge movement at the time, launched a vocal attack on Ponchaud’s writings and the writings of other critics of Pol Pot’s regime, accusing them of being anti-communist.³⁹ As an intellectual heavyweight, with his criticisms and refusal to believe or accept the true nature of the revolution in Cambodia, Chomsky helped muffle the alarm bells sounded by others.

Foreign intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, were involved in supporting Lon Nol’s regime and would, therefore, have had knowledge of the Khmer Rouge’s murderous methods even before 1975.⁴⁰ It was not in the interests of the United States to do anything to solve the problem, however. The massive ‘secret’ carpet bombing of Cambodia by the US Air Force played an immense role in the genocide, as the Khmer rouge could never have raised so many recruits to take power, had it not been for their anger at the American bombs.⁴¹ These new recruits were told that the bombs were coming from Lon Nol’s military force in Phnom Penh,

further fuelling anger at the government of the day and boosting the recruitment drive for the brutally violent rebel group.⁴²

Although the US had supported Lon Nol's military regime in its fight against Pol Pot's forces, President Gerald Ford along with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were quick to begin supporting Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, commencing not long after the rebels' assumption of power in 1975.⁴³ The administration was well aware of Pol Pot's violent ruthlessness but chose to sacrifice the people of Cambodia for the benefit of American policy objectives in Vietnam.⁴⁴ Prince Sihanouk stated himself in 1970, shortly before being overthrown by Lon Nol, that the Khmer Rouge "would present no great danger if they did not receive orders, weapons and supplies from abroad."⁴⁵

In 1970, communist China was competing with the Soviet Union for the affection of North Vietnam. Thus, the Chinese government brought the deposed Prince Sihanouk together with the North Vietnamese Premier, forging a coalition of sorts that would eventually lead to Sihanouk's alliance with the Khmer Rouge against Lon Nol.⁴⁶ When China and Vietnam fell out with each other, China sought to use the Khmer Rouge to counter Vietnamese and Soviet influence in the region. This stance put China and the US on common ground, as Nixon and Kissinger highlighted to Indonesian President Suharto in their December 6th meeting, telling him that "China does not have expansionist aims now ... their first concern is the Soviet Union and their second, Vietnam."⁴⁷ Thus, the US and China are both to blame for helping Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge come to power in Cambodia.

This support continued for years, with the US, UK, and China strongly backing the Khmer Rouge seat for Cambodia at the United Nations right up until 1992, despite the fact that the Khmer Rouge only held sway in a small area of Cambodia. The US, UK, China, and Thailand

helped rebuild the Khmer Rouge, providing humanitarian and military aid to the rebels in areas along the Thai border, enabling them to continue fighting, thus prolonging the suffering of Cambodians in the region.⁴⁸

The British government of Margaret Thatcher sent highly-trained Special Air Service (SAS) commandos to train the Khmer Rouge how to use British-supplied landmines as well as “booby-traps and ... time-delay devices,”⁴⁹ all the while denying that such assistance was being given. However, in June of 1991 the British government was forced to admit to training Khmer Rouge forces between 1983 and 1989,⁵⁰ while these forces were still terrorizing the Cambodian people and wreaking havoc on the country’s development. Had the US, UK, China, and Thailand not supported Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge during and after the group’s period in power, the deaths of many thousands of Cambodians would not have occurred.

EAST TIMOR

“There were about fifty of us then, all men, just picked up at random. All able-bodied men. ... Then the soldiers, there were three of them, started spraying us with bullets.”⁵¹

– Survivor of a massacre in the south of Dili, East Timor

THE BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE GENOCIDE IN EAST TIMOR

On December 7th, 1975 the Indonesian military launched a combined land, air, and sea invasion of East Timor, a former Portuguese colony which had declared independence only nine days earlier.⁵² What followed were the deaths of well over 100,000 people during an occupation that spanned the next twenty-four years.⁵³ In the most accurate and scientifically rigorous study of conflict-related mortality in East Timor, Romesh Silva and Patrick Ball estimate that the conflict in East Timor caused a minimum of 100,000 deaths between 1974-1999 due to hunger and illness alone.⁵⁴ In addition to this, at least 18,600 non-combatants are estimated to have been killed or disappeared.⁵⁵ Based on a population estimate of between 650,000 and 690,000 in December 1975,⁵⁶ these figures represent the destruction of 17-22% of the total population.⁵⁷

Following the Portuguese ‘Carnation Revolution’ in 1974, East Timor was one of many Portuguese colonies set to be decolonized, but it held lower priority than other colonies such as Mozambique and Angola. Thus, one outcome of the revolution in Portugal was a political vacuum in East Timor.⁵⁸ With no higher authority to govern the island nation, two political parties emerged and fought a brief civil war.⁵⁹ The East Timorese Front for Independence (FRETILIN) was solidly in power by the fall of 1975.⁶⁰

However, the Indonesian government of the day was pleased neither with this result nor the declaration of independence they, correctly, assumed to be imminent. As the regional heavyweight, Indonesia asserted its self-imposed duty to maintain stability in the area: on December 6th, 1975, the day before the invasion, Indonesia's President Suharto met with Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger in Jakarta. Suharto claimed that "Indonesia has no territorial ambitions. We are concerned only about the security, tranquility and peace of Asia and the Southern Hemisphere."⁶¹ This supposed concern for regional peace, reinforced by claims that FRETILIN was a communist threat,⁶² formed the basis for Indonesia's paper-thin justification for invading East Timor the next day.

While Cambodia had been attacked eight months earlier by a communist rebel group from within, East Timor was assaulted by the violently anti-communist regional heavyweight, whose troops had been carrying out attacks in the western regions of East Timor since the beginning of September.⁶³ In one of these attacks, which occurred on October 16th, 1975, Indonesian troops invaded the town of Balibo, where they murdered not only members of the indigenous population but also five journalists sent by two Australian television networks to report on the situation on the island.⁶⁴

Before further analysis of the genocide, it is important to establish that the atrocities committed by the Indonesian military did in fact constitute an act of genocide. East Timor's population was, and still is, extremely ethnically and culturally diverse and everyone suffered under the repression; no single cultural, racial, or religious group was safe. However, similar to the Khmer Rouge targeting of Chams and Vietnamese in Cambodia, the violence in East Timor did single out some groups more than others. For instance, the Chinese inhabitants of the country were clearly targeted for execution.⁶⁵ In several instances there have been reports

of local Chinese separated by the military from other ethnic groups and murdered en masse.⁶⁶ One explanation for targeting local Chinese is that they formed the merchant class in East Timor, owning nearly all of the businesses.⁶⁷ Following the murder of a huge segment of the 20,000 Chinese population, the rest fled the country. Subsequently, Indonesians and supporters of integration filled the “vacuum in business leadership,” replacing the Chinese as the new merchant class.⁶⁸

Furthermore, able-bodied males of military age were specifically targeted by the Indonesian military for detention, torture, and/or execution, regardless of whether they were combatants or non-partisan civilians.⁶⁹ The reason for this is probably because these members of society were deemed more likely to join the armed struggle against Indonesia; the military may have felt that such an eventuality had to be pre-empted.

Based on these facts, the actions of the Indonesian military constitute an act of genocide. The Indonesian military intended to destroy, in part, a national group, the East Timorese, as well as an ethnic group, the Chinese. The argument can be made that the people of East Timor did not form a unified national group because of their cultural, ethnic, and religious differences. However, this variegated society was not a recent creation.⁷⁰ The East Timorese had lived for centuries under Portuguese colonial rule as a separate entity from other nearby islands ruled by the Dutch, thus developing a separate national identity.⁷¹

If one looks to the Genocide Convention, it is clear that the Indonesian military attempted to destroy these two segments of East Timorese society by “(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; ... (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”⁷² The first of these points has already been examined. The second,

concerning bodily or mental harm, is evident in accounts of cruel torture by the Indonesian military⁷³ and the physical scars still visible on the bodies of some East Timorese today. Widespread rape of women, particularly those aged 15-24, certainly caused physical and mental harm to a huge segment of the population.⁷⁴ There is also evidence to suggest that Indonesian authorities forcibly sterilized women and promoted “long-acting chemical forms of contraception.”⁷⁵ Finally, many children were forcibly removed from their families, hospitals, or orphanages by Indonesian authorities and taken to Indonesia to be used as servants in Indonesian homes.⁷⁶ Taking all of this information into account, it is clear that genocide took place in East Timor between 1975 and 1999.

The Indonesian military was especially brutal in the initial months of the occupation, forcing hundreds of people to kneel at the edge of the wharves in Dili, the capital, before shooting them so that the bodies fell into the water.⁷⁷ Entire families were burned alive in their homes.⁷⁸ Husbands were executed in front of their wives, women were forced to dig large graves for Indonesian soldiers,⁷⁹ and thousands of young girls were raped.⁸⁰ In 1981, Indonesian soldiers rounded up approximately eighty thousand East Timorese men and forced them to march in lines across the island in an attempt to force resistance fighters out of hiding.⁸¹ Indonesian infantry marched behind the civilians, shooting any resistance fighters they found. Hundreds of the men forced to march died from exposure and starvation.⁸² It remains uncertain how Suharto’s cherished “security, tranquility and peace” fit into this invasion and occupation of East Timor.

PROPOSED CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF THE GENOCIDE IN EAST TIMOR

“My friends and I were forced to join the Indonesian army. We were warned; all who didn't join their army had to take the consequences. That means they say you are Communist. None of us wanted to but there was no way not to fight. If you don't fight you get killed yourself.”⁸³

– Jorge, a Timorese man forced to join the Indonesian army at age eighteen

As with the Cambodian genocide, the reasons for the murder of a huge segment of the East Timorese population are not easily identified. The causes of the 1975 invasion can be identified with a certain level of confidence, but why did the Indonesian authorities commit genocide? To explain the genocide, one must first understand the invasion.

Despite its small size geographically and economically, East Timor was seen by Suharto's Indonesia in 1975 as a vital territorial acquisition partly because of its natural resources: sandalwood, coffee, rare blue marble, copper, zinc, and especially oil and gas.⁸⁴ Indeed, these two latter resources have been a source of interest for other foreign powers as well, notably China and Australia.⁸⁵ However, these were the primary motivators neither of the invasion nor the genocide that ensued.

Indonesia's primary justification for invading East Timor lies in Suharto's continued efforts to maintain control over the numerous islands making up Indonesia, not all of which were happy to be governed by Jakarta.⁸⁶ Given the geographic proximity of the island of Timor to the rest of Indonesia, Suharto feared that East Timorese independence would encourage independence movements elsewhere in the archipelago, such as Aceh and Irian Jaya (West Papua).⁸⁷ Unrest in these regions has continued over the last three decades, and this has been used until recently to justify the continued occupation of East Timor.⁸⁸

Suharto was also afraid that an independent East Timor could play host to hostile foreign elements trying to loosen his grip on power, especially if the new East Timorese government were communist.⁸⁹ Suharto insisted that FRETILIN was a Marxist political entity, but in reality they “did not regard themselves as Marxists but as nationalists who believed they could draw on Marxism and adapt it to nationalist ends.”⁹⁰ However, communist China recognized East Timor’s independence early on, and Suharto claimed this as proof that his fears were well-founded.

With this basic explanation of the reasons for the invasion and occupation of East Timor, the genocide that killed about one fifth of the population can be understood as a means to achieve an end. Resistance to the invasion was strong in East Timor: FALINTIL, the military wing of FRETILIN, was relatively well-organized and had approximately 20,000 Portuguese-trained soldiers under arms when Indonesia invaded.⁹¹ Villagers who were not combatants were compelled to engage in anti-Indonesian activities and assist the resistance, and the resistance soldiers were clever, efficiently using the limited materials at their disposal to do the maximum damage.⁹² Because the resistance, and FALINTIL in particular, was difficult to suppress, the Indonesian military engaged in an ongoing pacification campaign which sought to control the people through fear.

Unlike the consistent violence and killing that occurred throughout the twenty-four year occupation, the reasons behind the initial murderous rampage by Indonesian soldiers in 1975 are not as clear. It is important to realize that the Indonesian military has not followed the example of Western military forces in subjecting itself completely to the will of the government in power. Thus, while Suharto ordered the invasion of East Timor, it is unlikely that he personally instructed the military commanders to proceed exactly as they did.

Jakarta's imperfect control over Indonesia's armed forces was highlighted in 1999 when then-President Habibie decided to allow the East Timorese to vote in a popular consultation by secret ballot.⁹³ Habibie likely did not help plan the terror that followed. However, there is a persuasive body of evidence supporting claims that the violence was highly organized and directed by commanders at the highest levels of the military in Jakarta.⁹⁴ Immediately following East Timor's 78.5% vote in favour of independence,⁹⁵ the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesia militias massacred thousands⁹⁶ of East Timorese and destroyed approximately 70% of the buildings and infrastructure,⁹⁷ including the homes of 60,000 families.⁹⁸ The soldiers also forcibly deported 250,000 people to Indonesia and raped countless women.⁹⁹

Once again, Stanton's *Eight Stages of Genocide*¹⁰⁰ framework is a useful tool in trying to understand how this genocide could occur. The Indonesian soldiers and integrationist militias classified their opponents as Chinese or anti-Indonesian and symbolized their victims as Communists in the invasion. As in Cambodia, the killers were often unwilling participants acting out of self-preservation – Indonesian troops or East Timorese conscripts in the Indonesian military forced to fight.¹⁰¹ The East Timorese were dehumanized, treated as lesser beings by the Indonesian military and used as human shields¹⁰² and sex slaves.¹⁰³ The military leadership organized the troops and militias and helped polarize the local population into two distinct groups opposing each other. Finally, Stanton's 'preparation' stage was achieved when soldiers identified their targets as Chinese, or able-bodied males, or inhabitants of certain villages.¹⁰⁴ As in Cambodia, the genocide would likely not have taken the toll that it did, had these stages not occurred which permitted a slide from regular conflict to genocide, each step in itself not worrisome enough to lead sympathetic governments to step in and stop the process from resulting in mass violence.

ACTION AND INACTION OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

“America helps Indonesia with weapons. The Indonesians take coffee from Timor and with the money from that they pay back the Americans. So we Timorese pay for the bullets that kill us!”¹⁰⁵

– Edhina, survivor of the genocide in East Timor

Aside from Indonesia, there are three key international actors that deserve part of the blame for the East Timor genocide: the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. All three were well aware of the Indonesian military’s plans to invade in 1975. They also knew that Suharto’s extreme anti-communism had led to the murders of over 500,000 alleged communists in Indonesia a decade earlier.¹⁰⁶ This act of violence should have informed the decisions of the developed world’s leaders in their dealings with Suharto.

Publicly, both the UK and Australian governments continued to advocate the principle of self-determination, while they privately hoped to see East Timor absorbed by Indonesia. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office had already decided by March of 1975 that East Timor’s integration with Indonesia was the correct solution for the island nation’s future.¹⁰⁷ They planned to keep their heads down if the topic became an issue at the UN to “avoid siding against the Indonesian government.”¹⁰⁸ Once the invasion was underway, the British continued to advocate a policy of silence, despite their knowledge that “once the Indonesian forces had established themselves in Dili they went on a rampage of looting and killing.”¹⁰⁹ The advice of British Ambassador John A. Ford to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was to lie and say that, “if asked to comment on any stories of atrocities I suggest we say that we have no information.”¹¹⁰

Indonesia's resources and geographic proximity to Australia made it an important economic actor in the region, one with which the Australian government hoped to develop closer ties. The Australian government was aware of Indonesia's plans for invasion yet privately encouraged Suharto's government, expressing preference for integration.¹¹¹

*"It is quite clear that the Indonesians are going to take over the island sooner or later."*¹¹²

– Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 12 August 1975

The American government knew by March of 1975 that the Indonesian military was preparing for the "incorporation of Portuguese Timor into Indonesia ... by force if necessary."¹¹³ Secretary of State Kissinger approved the recommendations outlined in a top secret memo to maintain a "policy of silence" because America had "considerable interests in Indonesia and none in Timor."¹¹⁴ In early September of 1975, US intelligence services noted Indonesian special forces troops launching incursions into East Timor.¹¹⁵ Unlike the UK and Australia, the American government preferred to avoid public discussion of East Timorese self-determination. This is illustrated in the State Department's recommendation to the National Security Council that the American representative to the United Nations vote against a 1977 resolution condemning Indonesia's continued occupation of East Timor.¹¹⁶ The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation produced a lengthy report concerning the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor, which states that "the United States of America failed to support the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination, and that its political and military support were fundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation."¹¹⁷ One must not forget the previously discussed meeting between President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, and President Suharto the day before the invasion, in which Ford gave Suharto the

green light to invade. If Ford had put principles ahead of American Cold War interests and told Suharto that the US would not tolerate an act of aggression on East Timor, it is unlikely that Suharto would have proceeded as he did.

The most blatant offences of the British, Australian, and American governments during the invasion and occupation of East Timor involved military aid and arms sales to Indonesia. In a confidential document – intended to inform the soon-to-be-appointed head of the British diplomatic service of the situation in Indonesia and East Timor – British long-term interests were listed as including “encouraging defence sales.”¹¹⁸ Short-term objectives also included defence sales.¹¹⁹ One result of this policy is that eight Hawk warplanes suitable for ground attack were sold to the Indonesian military in 1978 and delivered in 1983.¹²⁰ It is no secret that they were used for saturation bombing in East Timor, but the British government still approved the sale of twenty-four more Hawk aircraft in 1993 and another sixteen in 1996.¹²¹

Australia was not much better: In public, the invasion and occupation were condemned as a case of “indiscriminate killing on a scale unprecedented in post-World War II history.”¹²² Secretly, however, other factors determined Australian policy, including hopes of arranging favourable oil and gas exploration deals in the area. In the period between 1975 and 1981, Australian military aid to Indonesia doubled.¹²³ Military training and intelligence continued to be provided to Indonesia until 1999, and throughout this era the Australian government tried to help cover up the Indonesian military’s atrocities in the diplomatic arena, going so far as to ask President Clinton in 1993 to soften his administration’s critical stance on Indonesia’s human rights record.¹²⁴

The United States, for its part, supplied approximately 90% of the arms used by Indonesia’s military for the initial invasion in 1975.¹²⁵ These arms had been supplied with

strings attached: the US Congress expressly prohibited the use of this military gear for anything but defensive operations. As such, Kissinger was aware before the invasion that this would be a problem. In the December 6th meeting with Suharto, Kissinger and Ford underline this point, explaining that the situation could be interpreted as self defence in order to pacify Congress.¹²⁶ In terms of direct military aid during the subsequent occupation of East Timor, the US trained over 2600 officers of the Indonesian military on American soil.¹²⁷ Furthermore, the US government took steps to prevent the United Nations from acting to resolve the situation in East Timor. US Ambassador to the UN during the Ford administration, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, bragged later on that “China altogether backed FRETILIN in Timor, and lost ... The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with not inconsiderable success.”¹²⁸

The passive stance of many key players in the international system and the active diplomatic and military support provided by other countries, especially the UK, Australia, and the US, helped Indonesia invade and occupy East Timor with impunity for twenty-four years. Had these countries not colluded with Indonesia and each other to achieve their own self-interested goals, the 1975-1999 genocide in East Timor would not have taken place.

CONCLUSION

*“To keep you is no benefit, to destroy you no loss.”*¹²⁹

– Oft-repeated Khmer Rouge slogan

The genocides in Cambodia and East Timor began within months of each other in 1975. One group of killers, the Khmer Rouge, engaged in a four year high intensity killing spree and, after falling from power, continued with two decades of low intensity violence that came to a close in 1998. The other group of killers, the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesia militias, spent twenty-four years killing, torturing, and sexually abusing the East Timorese with especially intense periods of violence during the first half decade of the occupation and the final months preceding East Timor’s independence in 1999. While the explanation for each of these genocides is quite unique, this paper has shown that they share more in common than a similar timeframe and geographic proximity.

In both cases, the mass murders and systematic violence that took place could have been stopped before they really started, or before the situation became as bad as it did. However, the foreign powers which could have halted the genocides chose passivity over action. The highest levels of government of several major powers were well aware of the activities building toward violence as well as the atrocities that occurred over the course of each conflict, yet they remained silent and tried to keep themselves uninvolved. Worse yet, the Khmer Rouge and Suharto’s Indonesia were actually supported by the United States and Britain as a means of countering communism in Asia. Communist China supported Pol Pot as a means of countering rival communist Soviet Union and Vietnamese influence in the region.

Meanwhile, Australia, publicized in recent years as the helpful neighbour of East Timor for sending troops to help establish peace and order, doubled its arms sales to Indonesia during the first five years of the East Timor genocide and continued to provide military aid until 1999.

Despite their claims to the contrary, these foreign powers have blood on their hands and share the blame with those who committed genocide on the ground. Although a wide variety of factors, some very difficult to assess, led to each of these genocides, one thing is now clear: The deaths and violence endured by millions of people under the Khmer Rouge and the Indonesian military could have been stopped and should have been stopped.

NOTES

Note: Where works cited are French language resources, the information and/or citations are based on translations by the author of this paper.

Maps on title page from:

1. United Nations Cartographic Section. Cambodia. Map. January 2004
<<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/cambodia.pdf>> (26 November 2006).
2. United Nations Cartographic Section. Timor-Leste. Map. January 2004
<<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/timor.pdf>> (26 November 2006).

¹ Although the country has officially been known as Timor-Leste since official independence in May 2002, this paper will use the term East Timor throughout, for the sake of consistency.

² Ben Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance in East Timor, 1975–99: Comparative Reflections on Cambodia," War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century, ed. Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 200.

³ Romesh Silva and Patrick Ball, "The Profile of Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974-1999," Report by the Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group to the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, 9 February 2006 <<http://www.hrdag.org/resources/publications/Benetech-CAVR-statistical-report.pdf>> (26 November 2006), 13 and 16.

⁴ Ben Kiernan, "The Cambodian Genocide and Imperial Culture," Cambodia Genocide Program Official Website, 26 August 2005 <<http://www.yale.edu/cgp/KiernanCambodia30thAnniversaryEssay.doc>> (28 November 2006).

⁵ United States Department of State, "American Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary of State, 6 December 1975," Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62, ed. William Burr and Michael L. Evans, 6 December 2001 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 9.

⁶ Dominique Luken-Roze, Cambodge : Vers de nouvelles tragédies? Actualités du Génocide, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005).

⁷ Luken-Roze, 123. Craig Etcheson cites data from the Documentation Center of Cambodia's Mapping Project which claims to have found 1.1 million victims of execution by the Khmer Rouge in nearly 20,000 mass graves in Cambodia. If this figure is correct then the total deaths caused by the Khmer Rouge, by execution or starvation and disease in excess of the peacetime baseline, is significantly higher – around 2.5-3 million (Etcheson, 60).

⁸ Luken-Roze, 123.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Craig Etcheson, After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 6.

¹¹ Michael Leifer, "The International Dimensions of the Cambodian Conflict," *International Affairs* 51, no. 4 (1975), 536.

¹² Teeda Butt Mam, "Worms from Our Skin,." Children of Cambodia's Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors, ed. Kim DePaul, compiled by Dith Pran (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 11.

¹³ Etcheson, 7.

¹⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," 12 January 1951 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm> (26 November 2006).

¹⁵ Kiernan, "Imperial Culture."

¹⁶ Ben Kiernan, "Coming to Terms with the Past: Cambodia," *History Today* 54, no. 9, (2004), 16.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Philippe Richer, Le Cambodge : Une tragédie de notre temps (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2001), 69.

- ¹⁹ Gregory H. Stanton, "Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the Cambodian Genocide," Genocide Watch Official Website, 02 April 2002 <<http://www.genocidewatch.org/bluescarves.htm>> (23 November 2006).
- ²⁰ Stanton, "Blue Scarves."
- ²¹ Figure taken from a display photographed by the author at Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Phnom Penh, 12 December 2005.
- ²² Richer, 49-51.
- ²³ Patrick Raszelenberg, "The Khmers Rouges and the Final Solution," *History & Memory* 11, no. 2 (1999), 67.
- ²⁴ Thomas Clayton, "Re-orientations in moral education in Cambodia since 1975," *Journal of Moral Education* 34, no. 4 (2005), 508.
- ²⁵ Stanton, "Blue Scarves."
- ²⁶ From the author's visit to the Tuol Sleng Museum, 12 December 2005.
- ²⁷ To see some of the photos of torture victims, see "Photographs and Exhibitions," Documentation Center of Cambodia official website, 26 March 2006 <<http://www.dccam.org/Archives/Protographs/Photographs.htm>> (29 November 2006).
- ²⁸ Luken-Roze, 124.
- ²⁹ François Ponchaud, "Le Kampuchéa démocratique : une révolution radicale," *Mondes Asiatiques* 6 (1976), 155.
- ³⁰ Richer, 17-20.
- ³¹ Richer, 20-26.
- ³² W.E. Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party," *Pacific Affairs* 54, no. 2 (1981), 216.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Stanton, "Blue Scarves."
- ³⁵ Gregory H. Stanton, "The Eight Stages of Genocide," Genocide Watch Official Website, 11 April 2006 <<http://www.genocidewatch.org/8stages2006.htm>> (23 November 2006).
- ³⁶ This is only a cursory explanation of Stanton's analysis. For a detailed explanation with examples, see Stanton, "Eight Stages."
- ³⁷ "House of Commons Debate 22 July 1991," *Hansard House of Commons Official Report* 195, Column 863, February 2000 <<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199091/cmhansrd/1991-07-22/Debate-9.html>> (26 November 2006).
- ³⁸ Ponchaud, 153-180.
- ³⁹ Sophal Ear, "The Khmer Rouge Canon 1975-1979: The Standard Total Academic View on Cambodia," Diss. University of California, Berkeley (1995) <<http://www.csua.berkeley.edu/~sophal/canon.pdf>> (20 November 2006), 5-6.
- ⁴⁰ Michael Leifer, "The International Dimensions of the Cambodian Conflict," *International Affairs* 51, no. 4 (1975), 537-539.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, 539.
- ⁴² Ben Kiernan, "'Collateral damage' means real people," *Bangkok Post* 20 October 2002. Reprinted on the Yale Genocide Studies Program website <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/collateral_damage.html> (December 1, 2006).
- ⁴³ Kiernan, "Imperial Culture."
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ Leifer, 536.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ United States Department of State, "Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579," 2.
- ⁴⁸ Puangthong Rungswasdisab, "Thailand's Response to the Cambodian Genocide," *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*, ed. Susan E. Cook, Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series no. 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2004) <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/new_perspectives.html> (23 November 2006), 91.
- ⁴⁹ John Pilger, "How Thatcher gave Pol Pot a hand," *The New Statesman* 129, no. 4482 (2000), 22.
- ⁵⁰ "House of Commons Debate."
- ⁵¹ John G. Taylor, *East Timor: The Price of Freedom* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 68-69.
- ⁵² Ben Saul, "Was the Conflict in East Timor 'Genocide' and Why Does it Matter?" *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 2, no. 2 (2001), 498.
- ⁵³ Silva and Ball, 154.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 17.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 9.

⁵⁶ Ben Kiernan, "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-80 (Research Note)," *Critical Asian Studies* 35, no. 4 (2003), 591.

⁵⁷ Calculations based on minimum/maximum +/- error of Silva and Ball's findings.

⁵⁸ Roger S. Clark, "Does the Genocide Convention Go Far Enough? Some Thoughts on the Nature of Criminal Genocide in the Context of Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor," *Ohio Northern University Law Review* 8 (1981), 322.

⁵⁹ Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance," 202.

⁶⁰ Derrick Silove, "Conflict in East Timor: Genocide or Expansionist Occupation?" *Human Rights Review* 1, no. 3 (2000), 64.

⁶¹ United States Department of State, "Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579," 8.

⁶² "Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee 6 December 1999," *Official Committee Hansard* <<http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s2814.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 980.

⁶³ Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance," 205.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Silove, 69.

⁶⁶ Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance," 210-211.

⁶⁷ Drew Cottle and Helen Masterman-Smith, "Funu: The politics of East Timorese resistance, 1974-79," *Papers from the Jubilee Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Canberra, 2-4 October 2002*, 2 January 2003 <<http://arts.anu.edu.au/sss/apsa/Papers/cottle+msmith.pdf>> (2 December 2006), 6.

⁶⁸ Silove, 69.

⁶⁹ Silva and Ball, 61.

⁷⁰ An analogy may be made to Canadian society to explain the co-existence of multiple ethnic groups which identify with their own ancestral heritage while being patriotic full-fledged Canadians at the same time. If a group deliberately tried to exterminate all Canadians, this would constitute genocide even though Canadians are vastly multi-ethnic.

⁷¹ East Timor was an overseas territory of Portugal from 1596-1975, and Portuguese remains the only official language of the country.

⁷² Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

⁷³ Silva and Ball, 38-39.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 65.

⁷⁵ Silove, 71-72.

⁷⁶ Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), "Part 8: Responsibility and Accountability," *CAVR Final Report*, published online in: *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 176*, ed. Brad Simpson, 24 January 2006 <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB176/CAVR_responsibility.pdf> (29 November 2006), 46.

⁷⁷ Michele Turner, *Telling: East Timor, Personal Testimonies, 1942-1992* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1992), 103.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 172.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 103.

⁸⁰ Silva and Ball, 38.

⁸¹ Silove, 68-69.

⁸² Turner, 185.

⁸³ Ibid, 172.

⁸⁴ Ian Storey, "China and East Timor: Good, But Not Best Friends," *China Brief: A Journal of Information and Analysis* 6, no. 14 (2006) <http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_006_014.pdf> (26 November 2006), 5.

⁸⁵ China conducted a study of onshore oil and gas in East Timor's interior, but Australian countries own the rights to the majority of oil exploration rights in the Timor Gap, the ocean space between East Timor and Australia.

⁸⁶ Silove, 66.

⁸⁷ Ruth Wedgwood, *East Timor and the UN*. (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 2001) <<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=6850>> (29 November 2006), 2.

⁸⁸ Silove, 66; Wedgwood, 10.

⁸⁹ Storey, 3.

- ⁹⁰ Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance," 206. An example of the difference between conventional Marxism and the FRETILIN interpretation of Marxism is when FRETILIN leader Nicolau Lobato donated his family's coffee plantations to the state but continued to be a religious person, something not permitted by traditional Marxism.
- ⁹¹ Cottle and Masterman-Smith, 4.
- ⁹² For example, they would tie a light to a horse and set it running, and the Indonesians would fire mortar rounds at the appearance of hostile movement, wasting ordnance. See Cottle and Masterman-Smith for more information on the resourcefulness of the East Timorese resistance movement.
- ⁹³ Wedgwood, 4.
- ⁹⁴ Joseph Nevins, "The Making of Ground Zero in East Timor in 1999: an Analysis of International Complicity in Indonesia's Crimes," *Asian Survey* 42, no. 4 (2002), 624-625.
- ⁹⁵ Wedgwood, 4; "Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee," 1003-1004; CAVR, 48-49.
- ⁹⁶ Silva and Ball, 13.
- ⁹⁷ Nevins, 623.
- ⁹⁸ CAVR, 49.
- ⁹⁹ Nevins, 623.
- ¹⁰⁰ Stanton, "Eight Stages."
- ¹⁰¹ Turner, 172.
- ¹⁰² Silove, 68-69.
- ¹⁰³ CAVR, 34.
- ¹⁰⁴ Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance," 211.
- ¹⁰⁵ Turner, 111.
- ¹⁰⁶ Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance," 224-225.
- ¹⁰⁷ British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Confidential Memorandum for Ministers 17 March 1975: The Future of Portuguese Timor," published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174, ed. Brad Simpson, 28 November <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk01.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 1.
- ¹⁰⁸ British Embassy in Jakarta, "Confidential Letter: Untitled Covering Letter to Mr Duggan's Report on his Visit to Portuguese Timor," published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174, ed. Brad Simpson, 28 November <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk03.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 2.
- ¹⁰⁹ British Embassy in Jakarta, "Secret Telegram: Timor 24 December 1975," published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174, ed. Brad Simpson <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk20.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 2.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹¹ Nevins, 628-629.
- ¹¹² United States Department of State, "The Secretary's Principals and Regional Staff Meeting 12 August 1975," published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62, ed. William Burr and Michael L. Evans, 6 December 2001 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc2.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 5.
- ¹¹³ United States National Security Council, "Memo from W.R. Smyser to Henry Kissinger: Policy Regarding Possible Indonesian Military Action against Portuguese Timor 4 March 1975," published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174, ed. Brad Simpson, 28 November <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/963.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 2.
- ¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹⁵ Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance," 205.
- ¹¹⁶ United States Department of State, "Action Memo: UNGA Resolution on East Timor 1 November 1977," Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174, ed. Brad Simpson, 28 November 2005 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/229.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 6.
- ¹¹⁷ CAVR, 91.
- ¹¹⁸ British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Sir Michael Palliser's visit to Indonesia: 26 September 1975," published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174, ed. Brad Simpson, 28 November 2005 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk06.pdf>> (29 November 2006), 1-2.
- ¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.
- ¹²⁰ Brad Simpson, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174 (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2005) <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk06.pdf>> (29 November 2006).

¹²¹ Nevins, 632.

¹²² *Ibid*, 629.

¹²³ *Ibid*.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 630.

¹²⁶ United States Department of State, "Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579," 10.

¹²⁷ Nevins, 630-631.

¹²⁸ Matthew Jardine, "East Timor, the United Nations, and the International Community: Force Feeding Human Rights into the Institutionalised Jaws of Failure," *Pacifica Review* 12, no. 1 (2000), 52.

¹²⁹ Mam, 13.

WORKS CITED

- British Embassy in Jakarta. "Confidential Letter: Untitled Covering Letter to Mr Duggan's Report on his Visit to Portuguese Timor." Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174. Ed. Brad Simpson. 28 November 2005 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk03.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- British Embassy in Jakarta. "Secret Telegram: Timor 24 December 1975." Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174. Ed. Brad Simpson. 28 November 2005 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk20.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. "Confidential Memorandum for Ministers 17 March 1975: The Future of Portuguese Timor." Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174. Ed. Brad Simpson. 28 November 2005 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk01.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. "Sir Michael Palliser's visit to Indonesia: 26 September 1975." Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174. Ed. Brad Simpson. 28 November 2005 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk06.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- Clark, Roger S. "Does the Genocide Convention Go Far Enough? Some Thoughts on the Nature of Criminal Genocide in the Context of Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor." *Ohio Northern University Law Review* 8 (1981), 321-328.
- Clayton, Thomas. "Re-orientations in moral education in Cambodia since 1975." *Journal of Moral Education* 34, no. 4 (2005), 505-517.
- Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). "Part 8: Responsibility and Accountability." CAVR Final Report. Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 176. Ed. Brad Simpson. 24 January 2006 <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB176/CAVR_responsibility.pdf> (29 November 2006).
- Cottle, Drew, and Helen Masterman-Smith. "Funu: The politics of East Timorese resistance, 1974-79." Papers from the Jubilee Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Canberra, 2-4 October 2002. 2 January 2003 <<http://arts.anu.edu.au/sss/apasa/Papers/cottle+msmith.pdf>> (2 December 2006).
- Ear, Sophal. "The Khmer Rouge Canon 1975-1979: The Standard Total Academic View on Cambodia." Diss. University of California, Berkeley (1995) <<http://www.csua.berkeley.edu/~sophal/canon.pdf>> (20 November 2006).

- Etcheson, Craig. *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide*. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005)
- “House of Commons Debate 22 July 1991.” *Hansard House of Commons Official Report* 195, Column 863. February 2000 <<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199091/cmhansrd/1991-07-22/Debate-9.html>> (26 November 2006).
- Jardine, Matthew. “East Timor, the United Nations, and the International Community: Force Feeding Human Rights into the Institutionalised Jaws of Failure.” *Pacifica Review* 12, no. 1 (2000), 47-62.
- Kiernan, Ben. “The Cambodian Genocide and Imperial Culture.” Cambodia Genocide Program Official Website. 26 August 2005 <<http://www.yale.edu/cgp/KiernanCambodia30thAnniversaryEssay.doc>> (28 November 2006).
- Kiernan, Ben. “‘Collateral damage’ means real people.” *Bangkok Post* 20 October 2002. Reprinted on the Yale Genocide Studies Program website <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/collateral_damage.html> (December 1, 2006).
- Kiernan, Ben. “Coming to Terms with the Past: Cambodia.” *History Today* 54, no. 9, (2004), 16-19.
- Kiernan, Ben. “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-80 (Research Note).” *Critical Asian Studies* 35, no. 4 (2003), 585-597.
- Kiernan, Ben. “War, Genocide, and Resistance in East Timor, 1975-99: Comparative Reflections on Cambodia.” *War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century*. Ed. Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 199-233.
- Leifer, Michael. “The International Dimensions of the Cambodian Conflict.” *International Affairs* 51, no. 4 (1975), 531-543.
- Luken-Roze, Dominique. *Cambodge : Vers de nouvelles tragédies? Actualités du Génocide*. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005).
- Mam, Teeda Butt. “Worms from Our Skin.” *Children of Cambodia's Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors*. Ed. Kim DePaul. Compiled by Dith Pran. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 11-18.
- Nevins, Joseph. “The Making of Ground Zero in East Timor in 1999: an Analysis of International Complicity in Indonesia’s Crimes.” *Asian Survey* 42, no. 4 (2002), 623-641.

- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." 12 January 1951 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm> (26 November 2006).
- "Photographs and Exhibitions." Documentation Center of Cambodia official website. 26 March 2006 <<http://www.dccam.org/Archives/Protographs/Photographs.htm>> (29 November 2006).
- Pilger, John. "How Thatcher gave Pol Pot a hand." *The New Statesman* 129, no. 4482 (2000), 21-22.
- Ponchaud, François. "Le Kampuchéa démocratique : une révolution radicale." *Mondes Asiatiques* 6 (1976), 153-180.
- Raszelenberg, Patrick. "The Khmers Rouges and the Final Solution." *History & Memory* 11, no. 2 (1999), 62-93.
- Richer, Philippe. *Le Cambodge : Une tragédie de notre temps*. (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2001).
- Rungswasdisab, Puangthong. "Thailand's Response to the Cambodian Genocide." *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*. Ed. Susan E. Cook. Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series no. 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2004), 79-126 <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/new_perspectives.html> (23 November 2006).
- Saul, Ben. "Was the Conflict in East Timor 'Genocide' and Why Does it Matter?" *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 2, no. 2 (2001), 477-522.
- "Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee 6 December 1999." *Official Committee Hansard*. 971-1008 <<http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commtee/s2814.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- Silove, Derrick. "Conflict in East Timor: Genocide or Expansionist Occupation?" *Human Rights Review* 1, no. 3 (2000), 62-79.
- Silva, Romesh, and Patrick Ball. "The Profile of Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974-1999." Report by the Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group to the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. 9 February 2006 <<http://www.hrdag.org/resources/publications/Benetech-CAVR-statistical-report.pdf>> (26 November 2006).
- Simpson, Brad, ed. *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2005) <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/uk06.pdf>> (29 November 2006).

- Stanton, Gregory H. "Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the Cambodian Genocide." Genocide Watch Official Website. 02 April 2002 <<http://www.genocidewatch.org/bluescarves.htm>> (23 November 2006).
- Stanton, Gregory H. "The Eight Stages of Genocide." Genocide Watch Official Website. 11 April 2006 <<http://www.genocidewatch.org/8stages2006.htm>> (23 November 2006).
- Storey, Ian. "China and East Timor: Good, But Not Best Friends." *China Brief: A Journal of Information and Analysis* 6, no. 14 (2006), 3-6. <http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_006_014.pdf> (26 November 2006).
- Taylor, John G. *East Timor: The Price of Freedom*. (London: Zed Books, 2000).
- Turner, Michele. *Telling: East Timor, Personal Testimonies, 1942-1992*. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1992).
- United States Department of State. "Action Memo: UNGA Resolution on East Timor 1 November 1977." Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174. Ed. Brad Simpson. 28 November 2005 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/229.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- United States Department of State. "American Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary of State, 6 December 1975." Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62. Ed. William Burr and Michael L. Evans. 6 December 2001 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- United States Department of State. "The Secretary's Principals and Regional Staff Meeting 12 August 1975." Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62. Ed. William Burr and Michael L. Evans. 6 December 2001 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc2.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- United States National Security Council. "Memo from W.R. Smyser to Henry Kissinger: Policy Regarding Possible Indonesian Military Action against Portuguese Timor 4 March 1975." Published online in: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 174. Ed. Brad Simpson. 28 November 2005 <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/963.pdf>> (29 November 2006).
- Wedgwood, Ruth. *East Timor and the UN*. (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 2001) <<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=6850>> (29 November 2006).
- Willmott, W.E. "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party." *Pacific Affairs* 54, no. 2 (1981), 209-227.

WORKS CONSULTED

Kiernan, Ben. "Cover-Up and Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor, and the Aborigines." *Critical Asian Studies* 34, no. 2 (2002), 163-192.

Maley, William. "Australia and the East Timor Crisis: Some Critical Comments." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 2 (2000), 151-161.

United Nations Security Council. "Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General." 9 August 1999 <<http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/1999/862>> (29 November 2006).

United Nations Security Council. "Report of the Secretary-General on justice and reconciliation for Timor-Leste." 26 July 2006 <<http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2006/580>> (23 November 2006).

United Nations Security Council. "Report of the Security Council Mission to East Timor and Indonesia." 21 November 2000 <<http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2000/1105>> (23 November 2006).